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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in the Utah Court of Appeals is conferred
by Section 78-2a-3(2)(k) of the Judicial Code and by Rule 3 of
the Utah Rul es of .Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Whether the trial court was correct in law in
determining that a release was sufficiently clean arid unequivocal
to release defendant from liability for its alleged negligence?
See Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co, , 793 p.2d 362, 370 (Utah
1990) (upholding exculpatory agreement).

The applicable standard

of appellate review for a question of law is "review for
correctness . . . ."

Hansen v. Dept. of Financial Institutions,

858 P.2d 184, 186 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
DETERMINATIVE RULES
There are no determi na t::i i e sta to ites, const: tutiona]
provisions, ordinances, rules or regulations in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Charles J. Russ ("Russ") brought this
wrongful death action against Woodside Homes, Inc. ("Woodside"),
for the death of i i i s • w:i f e, Rose Russ ("M t: s , Ri iss ") , who d i < H1
approximately two weeks after she fell at a Woodside construction
site.

Russ and Mrs. Russ (collective!v

exculpat

i-jreement releas .:•. *.*. , «. . ;

: - "Russes") signed an
:i a b. i 1 i ty.

Russ believes he is entitled to bring this action because the

1

(

.LI,

agreement did not expressly mention releasing Woodside for
liability from its own alleged negligence.

Woodside, on the

other hand, counters that under Utah law, the exculpatory
agreement is binding whether or not it mentioned Woodside's
liability for its alleged negligence.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On February 28, 1994, Russ filed his wrongful death

complaint ("Complaint"); Woodside filed its Answer on March 21,
1994.

[R. 12, 18].
On August 4, 1994, Woodside filed a motion for summary

judgment.

[R. 25, 33]. The trial court granted Woodside's

Motion for Summary Judgment on October 27, 1994.

[R. 73] .

On October 31, 1994, Russ filed a notice of appeal and
on February 8, 1995, served his Brief of Appellant on Woodside.
[R. 75] .
C.

DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
Woodside sought summary judgment in its favor on

grounds that an exculpatory agreement barred Russ' action.

The

trial court granted Woodside7s motion and issued its Memorandum
Decision on September 19, 1994.

[R. 70, 73] (See Memorandum

Decision attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "A.").

The trial

court found that, even though the exculpatory agreement did not
specifically address Woodside's alleged negligence, "the fact
that the language in the release holds defendant harmless xto the
fullest extent permitted by law' would seem to include negligent

2

acts.

The 1 aw i n most circumstances w:i ] 1 n :>t: a ] ] ov> a release of

intentional torts or gross negligence, but where the contract
language provides a release to the 'fullest extent permitted by
1 av • woi :i ] :i seen t a s a ma11er :)f coui se t:o : i ii ::: 1 uc:ie negligent
acts. "

[R. 69] .
Additionally, the trial court observed that the

contract described the various dangers c if c :onstn ictd on site and
that the agreement "specifically held defendant harmless for
'death, accident, injury or other occurrence;' in fact, Plaintiff
in his Complaint uses this same specif:! c language when he states
'at the time of the accident' described herein "

[R. 6 9 ] .

Thus,

the trial court was "persuaded that Plaintiff and Decedent were
put on notice as to the type of possible injury which could be
sustained in a visit to the job site and that it was their intent
to release Defendant
negligent acts."
D*

: •r

;• .•;! • Jtractors from anj possible

Id.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 12

1 992 , the R\ isses and Woodsd cie s:i gried

an agreement under which Woodside agreed to construct a home for
the Russes.

[R. 26] . The agreement contained a release (the

"Russ Release" :: r "Release") statd ng that:
[t]he construction site is a dangerous place
to visit. Buyer agrees to exercise extreme
caution if the Buyer chooses to visit the
site, to limit the number of such visits, and
to refrain from allowing Buyer's or other
children to accompany Buyer on such visits.
Buyer, to the fullest extent permitted by
law, agrees to hold harmless Woodside
3

•

(including its affiliates and subsidiaries
and other contractors and subcontractors and
their agents and employees) from any and all
claims, damages, loss and expenses, including
but not limited to attorneys' fees, arising
out of any death, accident, injury, or other
occurrence resulting from visits to the job
site by Buyer or Buyer's family or other
guests.
[R. 26] (See Agreement to Commence Construction, attached hereto
as Addendum Exhibit "B.").
Russ alleged that he and Mrs. Russ visited the job site
a few days before Thanksgiving, 1992.

[R. 6-7]. Russ also

alleged that while visiting the job site, Mrs. Russ fell into a
hole in the driveway of the home and was injured.

[R. 6]

Russ

further alleged that Mrs. Russ died approximately two weeks later
on December 12, 1992.

[R. 5]. On March 1, 1994, Russ.filed suit

alleging survival of action for injury and wrongful death.
[R. 9] .
It is worth noting that Russ' Statement of the Facts
and Argument include numerous facts not in the record.

The Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure require a party's factual statements
to be supported by the record.

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).

The

Utah Supreme Court has held that it will not consider factual
allegations unsupported by the record.

See Uckerman v. Lincoln

Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) (refusing to
consider unsupported factual contentions).

Not only are many of

the facts, too numerous to burden the Court with here,
unsupported in the record, they are also irrelevant surplusage

4

designed to pique the emotions of this Court.

Thus, Woodside

urges the Court to ignore those facts not supported by the
record.
E.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Russ Release is valid, even though it did not

specifically address Woodside's alleged negligence, under Freund
v. Utah Power & Light. 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990) (upholding
indemnity agreement).

The court found in Freund that "it is not

necessary that . . . exculpatory language refer[] expressly to
the negligence of the indemnitee . . . ."

Id. at 370. Thus, the

Russ Release is valid.
Additionally, the Russ Release remains valid under the
public servant exception to the general rule enforcing releases.
Under that exception, courts bar public servants from
contractually limiting their liability.
not a public servant.

Woodside, however, is

Thus, the public servant exception does

not apply.
Russ also argues that Woodside failed to meets its
burden of proof by showing that Mrs. Russ unequivocally agreed to
the Russ Release.

Russ improperly raises this issue on appeal

because the issue was not argued below.

Even assuming the

burden-of-proof argument was considered below, however, there is
no factual dispute that Mrs. Russ, signed and thereby agreed to
the Russ Release.

Under Utah law, a party may not deny knowledge

5

of an agreement to which she is a signatory.

Thus, Russ7 burden-

of-proof argument also fails as a matter of law.1
F.

ARGUMENT

I.

RUSS RELEASE IS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE UNDER GENERAL
RULE.
A.

The Russ Release Is Valid Even Though It Did Not
Specifically Discuss Woodsidefs Alleged
Negligence.

A release from liability for negligence is enforceable
where the intention to release one from liability for one's
alleged negligence is clearly and unequivocally expressed.2
Freund, 793 P.2d at 370. However, "it is not necessary that the
exculpatory language refers expressly to the negligence of the
indemnitee, so long as the intention to indemnify can be 'clearly
implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement,
and the surrounding facts and circumstances.'"

Id. at 370,

(quoting Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority v. Tri-Delta
Construction Corp.. 487 N.Y.S.2d 428, 430 (1985).

Thus, even

1

Russ also raises numerous public policy arguments and a
claim that the Russ Release does not operate against Mrs. Russ'
heirs.
These arguments also fail for the reasons stated herein.
2

Russ relies heavily upon the thirty-year old case of
Union Pacific Rail Road v. El Paso -Natural Gas Company to argue
that the Russ Release was not unequivocal. See Brief of
Appellant at 10 (citing 408 P.2d 910 (Utah 1965)). In the three
decades since Union Pacific, however, Utah courts have recognized
a "growing trend" to relax the strictness of the rules governing
exculpatory agreements. Freund, 793 P.2d at 370; see also
Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corp., 771 P.2d 664, 669 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) (identifying trend to limit strict construction of
releases and related agreements). Thus, Union Pacific is
inapplicable to the case at bar.
6

though the Russ Release did not mention Woodside's negligence, it
was still sufficiently clear to bind Russ to his promise to hold
Woodside harmless.
B.

The MBroad Sweep" Of The Russ Release Clearly
Identified Parties' Intent To Release Woodside
From Negligence Claims.

The Russ Release clearly identified that the Russes and
Woodside intended that Woodside be held harmless for Woodside's
alleged negligence.

A release from one's negligent conduct is

enforceable where "the broad sweep of the language employed by
the parties clearly covers those instances in which the licensor
may be negligent."

Freund. 793 P.2d at 371. The Freund court

found that language releasing the indemnitee from "any and all
claims . . . " constituted sufficiently broad wording to include
release from liability for one's alleged negligence.

Similarly,

the Russ Release released Woodside from "any and all claims
. . . ."

[R. 70]. Under the Freund analysis, then, the broad

sweep of the Russ Release clearly expressed the parties intent to
hold Woodside harmless.
Moreover, as the trial court observed, the Russ Release
held Woodside harmless "to the fullest extent permitted by law
. . . ."

[R. 70]. The broad sweep of that language also

suggests that the parties contemplated that Russ would hold
Woodside harmless for all legally-permissible liability,

7

including alleged negligence.3

Additionally, the Russ Release

also released Woodside for injury from any "accident."

In his

complaint, Russ admits that Mrs. Russ was injured in an
"accident."

[R. 7, 1 11].

It follows, then, that the Russ

Release clearly established the Russes' intent to release
Woodside from injuries arising from accidents.

Consequently,

Russ may not maintain this action.
C.

The Russes" Non-Commercial Status Does Not
Invalidate Russ Release.

Russ appears to contend that since the Russes were not
"commercially sophisticated," Freund is inapplicable to their
action.4

Such an argument is without merit.

Under Utah law,

releases are enforced between a private and a commercial party.
See Berube v. Fashion Centre, 771 P.2d 1033, 1040 (Utah 1989)
(finding release enforceable as a matter of law).
Moreover, Russ' argument is simply a plea to avoid the
effects of a poor bargain.

Utah courts have repeatedly refused

to permit plaintiffs such an escape.

See Equitable Life &

Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross. 849 P.2d. 1187, 1191 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) (stating that "sellers and buyers should be able to

Russ counters that "[m]ost consumers" are confused by
such language. B:lef of Appellant at 20. How most consumers
interpret the Russ Release is irrelevant. Moreover, Russ
presents no evidence that Mrs. Russ was confused by the language.
4

Contrary to Russ' assertion, a close reading of Freund
shows that the case did not involve a contract between
"commercially sophisticated parties." See Brief of Appellant at
21; 793 P.2d at 370.
8

contract on their own terms without the indulgence of paternalism
by the courts in the alleviation of one side or another from the
effects of a poor bargain."); see also Johnston v. Austin, 748
P.2d 1084, 1089 (Utah 1988) (applying same doctrine in real
estate bargain); see also Wolf v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522, 528 (Md.
1994) (enforcing release even though indemnitor was
"unsophisticated," eighteen-year-old investor).

In short,

whether or not the Russes were unseasoned negotiators should not
sway this Court from its position in Freund.
II.

SO-CALLED MINORITY RULE IS INAPPLICABLE TO WOODSIDE.
A.

The Minority Rule Is Simply Exception To The
General Rule.

The so-called minority rule is inapplicable because
Woodside is not a public servant.

Russ boldly suggests that the

minority rule is that all "exculpatory clauses are violative of
public policy," citing Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing
& Salvage Co.. 372 U.S. 697 (1963), for that proposition.5
of Appellant at 12. Dixilyn contains no such rule.

Brief

Instead,

Dixilyn concludes that exculpatory contracts indemnifying public
servants are unenforceable.

Id. at 698 (quoting Bisso v. Inland

Waterways Corp., 75 S.Ct. 629 (1955) . Thus, the minority rule,

5

Russ also cites California Civil Code section 1668 and
Louisiana Civil Code Annotated section 2004 for the proposition
that exculpatory clauses are invalid. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1668
(1994); La. Civ. Code Ann. § 2004 (1988). The California code,
however, voids only releases from gross negligence. The
Louisiana code expresses only the public policy of that state.
Therefore, both statutes are inapplicable to this case.
9

which is more often phrased as the exception to the general rule,
is that exculpatory contracts are generally enforceable, except
where the indemnitee is a public servant.6
B.

Woodside Is Not Public Servant Under Krohnert
Test.

Woodside is not a public servant under the commonlyaccepted test for determining whether an indemnitee is a public
servant.

In Krohnert v. Yacht Systems Hawaii. Inc., the court

set out numerous criteria for determining whether an indemnitee
is a public servant.7

664 P.2d 738, 745 (Hawaii App. 1983)

(finding exculpatory clause "permissible.") (quoting Tunkl v.

6

See Elite Professionals, Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 827 P.2d
1195, 1203 (Kan. App. 1992) (stating that "[t]he rule seems to be
that, unless against public policy, a contract exempting
liability will be enforced . . . . " ) ; 6A Corbin on Contracts
§ 1472 (1962) (stating that "[i]t is generally held that those
who are not engaged in public service may properly bargain
against liability for harm caused by their ordinary negligence in
performance of contractual duty . . . . " ) .
7

Russ cites four cases as support for this test. Three of
those four found that the defendant was not a public servant and
the exculpatory contract was valid. See Krohnert, 664 P.2d at
745 (finding defendant was not public servant); Lynch v. Santa Fe
National Bank, 627 P.2d 1247, 1251 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (finding
defendant was not public servant); Schrier v. Beltway Alarm Co.,
533 A.2d 1316, 1323 (Md. App. 1987) (finding defendant was not
public servant). The fourth, Tunkl v. Regents of University of
California, held that a hospital is a public servant. 383 P.2d
447 (Calif. 1963) (stating that "admission room of a hospital
contains no bargaining table . . . . " ) . Since Tunkl concerned a
hospital, which has obvious and substantial public necessity, it
is inapplicable to this action.
10

Regents of University of California, 383 P.2d 441, 445-446
(1963) . The factors8 are
1.

Whether the business is publicly regulated.

2.

Whether the business' services are of practical
necessity for some members of the public.

3.

Whether the business holds itself out to any
member of the public.

4.

Whether because of the essential nature of the
service, the party has a distinct bargaining
advantage.

5.

Whether the contract at issue is an adhesion
contract.

6.

Whether the purchaser or property is placed under
the control of the service provider.

Krohnert, 664 P.2d at 744-45. Woodside clearly fails each of
these criterion and thus, is not a public servant.
C.

Woodside*s Regulation Does Not Transform It Into A
Public Servant,

Simply because Woodside is state-regulated to some
extent, like a substantial number of other businesses, does not
transform Woodside into a public servant.

See Lee v. Sun Valley

Co., 695 P.2d 361, 363 (Idaho 1984) (holding that "mere fact that
[defendant] is licensed by the state does not impose a public
duty" upon defendant); Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving
Club, Inc.. 392 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (enforcing
exculpatory agreement despite government regulation of

8

None of these factors is dispositive of public servant
designation. See Wagenblast v. Odessa School Dist.. 758 P.2d
968, 971 (Wash. 1988) (evaluating Krohnert test).
11

defendant's conduct).

Russ argues that regulations requiring

that Woodside be licensed makes it a public servant.

See Brief

of Appellant at 17. However, a construction contractor's
services "are not qualitatively the same kind as those provided
by common carriers, hospitals, doctors or public utilities, which
are 'generally thought suitable for regulation.'"
N.W.2d at 731 (citation omitted).

Malecha, 392

Thus, that Woodside is

government-regulated does not transform it into a public servant.
D.

Woodside#s Service Is Important. But Not An
Absolute Necessity.

Woodside's services fill an important societal need,
but are not so essential as to justify public servant
designation.

Courts typically compare essential services to

indispensable services such as police protection9 and hospital
care.10

In both examples, parties have little or no choice about

with whom they may contract.

The Russes, on the other hand,

present no evidence that they could not have contracted with
someone other than Woodside to build their home.

Consequently,

Woodside is not a public servant.
E.

Woodside Was Under No Duty To Serve The Public.

This criteria is often reserved for business entities
who have a duty to "give reasonable service to all persons who

9

See Schrier v. Beltway Alarm Co.. 533 A.2d. 1316, 1323
(Md. App. 1987) (contrasting alarm company's services with
essential nature of police services).
10

Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 447.
12

apply . . . ," such as common carriers, public warehousemen and
innkeepers.

Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 446, n.12. While Woodside, of

course, contracts with the public, it has no duty to do so.
Consequently, it is not a public servant under this criteria.
P.

Since Russes Had Choice Not To Contract With
Woodside, Woodside Did Not En-joy Superior
Bargaining Position,

Since the Russes were free to contract with other
homebuilders, Woodside was not in a superior bargaining position.
Superior bargaining power requires "the absence of alternatives .
. . ."
744.

Lynch, 627 P.2d at 1250; see also Krohnert, 664 P.2d at

In the case at bar, Russ has presented no evidence that the

Russes had no alternative but to contract with Woodside.

Russ

also argues that the Russes were given no chance to "opt out" of
the exculpatory clause.

Brief of Appellant at 18. However,

"[p]roof that [plaintiff] had no opportunity to negotiate the
terms of the exculpatory agreement is not enough to show a
disparity of bargaining power."

Malecha, 392 N.W.2d at 730. In

short, the Russes offered no evidence that contracting services
"could not be obtained elsewhere."

Id.

Consequently, Woodside

did not enjoy a superior bargaining position in negotiating the
Russ Release.
G.

The Russ Release Was Not A Contract Of Adhesion.

The Russ Release was not a contract of adhesion.

A

contract of adhesion is an agreement forced, on a "'take it or
leave it basis,'" on one party by another who has superior
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bargaining strength.

Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 786 P.2d

763, 766 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (enforcing insurance contract)
(citation omitted).u

In short, an adhesion contract is one in

which the party has no alternatives.

As has been shown, the

Russes presented no evidence that they had no choice but to
contract with Woodside.

Thus, the Russ Release was not a

contract of adhesion.
H.

Woodside Did Not Control Russes Or Their Property,

The Russes and their property were not decisively under
Woodside's control. While Woodside was in partial, temporary
control of the property during construction, the Russ Release
expressly discouraged the Russes from visiting the site.
Moreover, the Russes visit to the construction site was
completely voluntary.

See Banfield v. Louis, 589 So. 2d 441, 446

(Fla. App. 1991) (refusing to find business was public servant
where plaintiff submitted to defendant's control on "completely
voluntary" basis.).

The control factor contemplates

circumstances where the plaintiff is at the complete mercy of,
for example, a hospital, or a school.
441; Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973.

See Tunkl, 3 83 P.2d at

The Russes were under no such

complete and dominating control.

Moreover, "that the terms of a contract are embodied in a
written form developed by one of the parties does not
automatically render it either a contract of adhesion or
unenforceable." Resource Mgt. Co. v. Western Ranch & Livestock
Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1048 (Utah 1985) (enforcing contract).
14

For these reasons, Woodside fulfills none of the
criteria for a public servant and the minority rule does not
apply to Woodside.

Instead, under the general rule, the Russ

Release is enforceable.12
12

Russ provides a lengthy string citation in his argument
in which nearly all of the case law agrees that under the general
rule, private, exculpatory contracts are enforceable. Brief of
Appellant at 12-13, citing Sirek v. Fairfield Snowbowl, 800 P.2d
1291, 1295 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (permitting party to
"contractually absolve itself from liability . . . . " ) ; Heil
Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo. 1989)
(stating that "[e]xculpatory agreements are not necessarily void
. . . . " ) ; Krohnert v. Yacht Systems Hawaii, Inc., 664 P.2d 738
(Hawaii App. 1983) (discussed supra pp. 10-11); Macek v.
Schooners Inc. , 586 N.E.2d. 442, 444 (111. App. 1991)
(permitting exculpatory clauses where clear and unequivocal);
Elite Professionals v. Carrier Corp., 827 P.2d 1195, 1202 (Kan.
App. 1992) (permitting disclaimer of liability); Schrier v.
Beltway Alarm Co.. 533 A.2d 1316 (Md. App. 1987) (enforcing
exculpatory agreement); Jones v. Walt Disney World Co., 409
F. Supp. 526, 528 (W.D. N.Y. 1976) (stating that exculpatory
clauses are considered valid); Lago v. Krollage, 575 N.E.2d 107,
110 (N.Y. 1991) (stating that exculpatory clauses are "generally
enforced"); Orlett v. Suburban Propane, 561 N.E.2d 1066, 1069
(Ohio App. 1989) (stating that contract "evading liability for
negligence will be enforced . . . . " ) ; Childress v. Madison
County, 777 S.W.2d. 1, 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that
"parties may contract that one shall not be liable for his
negligence . . . . " ) ; Waaenblast v. Odessa School Dist., 758 P.2d
968, 970 (Wash. 1988) (stating that it is "quite possible" to
limit liability for own negligence); Discount Fabric House, Inc.
v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 345 N.W.2d 417, 423 (Wis. 1984)
(permitting exculpatory contracts that do not violate public
policy); Schutkowski v. Carey, 725 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Wyo. 1986)
(stating that "Wyoming courts enforce exculpatory clauses . . .
if the clause is not contrary to public policy."); Dobratz v.
Thomson, 468 N.W.2d 654, 658 (Wis. 1991) (stating that
"exculpatory contracts are not 'automatically' void . . . . " ) .
Only three cases do not discuss the general rule. See Stanek v.
National Bank of Detroit, 430 N.W.2d 819, 821 (Mich. App. 1988)
(involving statutory restriction on releases in favor of banks);
Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So.2d 378 (Miss. 1982) (involving lease
rental agreement); Richardson-Wayland Electrical Corp. v.
Virginia Electrical & Power Co.. 247 S.E.2d 465, 467 (Va. 1978)
(continued...)
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III.

RUSS IMPROPERLY RAISES BURDEN OF PROOF ARGUMENT.
Russ improperly raises the issue that Woodside failed

to establish that Russ clearly and unequivocally agreed to the
Russ Release.

An appellant may not raise an issue on appeal that

was not properly argued below.

Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc.,

815 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Utah App. 1991) (summary judgment appeal
stating that "[w]e normally will not consider arguments on appeal
which were not raised before the trial court.").

Russ clearly

never raised below the issue of whether Mrs. Russ unequivocally
agreed to the Release.13

Thus# Russ is not entitled to raise

this issue on appeal.
Even if the Court considers the issue of whether Russ
unequivocally agreed to the Release as properly before the Court,
Russ' argument is still without merit for several reasons.

For

example, Russ transparently argues that "the contract only shows
that Mrs. Russ signed a contract . . . , but did not understand
the release."

Russ can not claim that Mrs. Russ did not

understand the Release.

See Western Properties v. Southern Utah

12

(. . .continued)
(stating that public service company can not relieve itself from
liability). None of those cases are applicable here.
13

In the only possible reference to this issue, Russ raises
a theoretical question about whether a hypothetical plaintiff has
"read" a contract, citing a different case than the one upon
which he relies in his appeal Brief. [R. 39] . Whether a generic
plaintiff has read a contract is completely distinct from whether
Woodside met the heightened standard of law which Russ now
contends is at issue. In short, no where below does Russ discuss
a requirement that Woodside has the burden to prove that Russ
clearly and unequivocally agreed to the Release.
16

Aviation. 776 P.2d 656, 658 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that "a
signatory cannot, with hindsight, claim ignorance of the contract
. . . . " ) ; see also Sweeney v. Taco Bell. Inc.. 824 S.W.2d 289,
291 (Tex. App. 1992) (holding that " [a]s a general rule, a
written release cannot be avoided on the ground that the releasor
was ignorant of, or mistaken about, the contents of the release,
or failed to read it before signing.").

Moreover, Russ presents

no evidence that Mrs. Russ did not understand the Release to
counter the fact that, since Mrs. Russ signed the Release, she
understood it.

Thus, even if this issue is properly before the

court, it is clear that the Russes had full knowledge of the
contents of the Russ Release.
Russ also argues, without citation to authority, that
the Russ Release was invalid because it was not printed in bold
type and because Russ did not initial the exculpatory clause.14
A contract's format is generally not a determinant of the
agreement's validity.

Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch,

706 P.2d 1028, 1048 (Utah 1985) (enforcing contract) (quoting
Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co.. 350 F.2d 445 (1965)).
"Far more important is whether key terms are 'hidden in a maze of
fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices.'"
(citation omitted).
was deceptive.

Id.

Russ presents no evidence that the Release

To the contrary, the simple, one-page contract

14

This argument appears to be an attempt to label the Russ
Release unconscionable. See, generally. Resource Management Co.
v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985).
17

displayed the release language prominently in the middle of the
page.

Thus, Russ' claim that the Russ Release was deceptive is

no bar to summary judgment.
IV.

RUSS' PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT MERIT.
Russ makes numerous public policy arguments that are

without merit.

For example, Russ argues that this Court should

invalidate the Russ Release lest injured parties be forced to
rely on government medical assistance, thereby hastening the
growth of the national debt.

Brief of Appellant at 15.

Notwithstanding the lack of evidence in support of this point,
Russ misunderstands the public policy considerations behind
releases.

Releases are designed to shift the burden of liability

among parties and their insurers, not to shift that burden to the
federal government.

See Pickhover v . Smith1s Management Corp.,

771 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (discussing limitation of
strict construction rule).

In short, it is not the government's

responsibility to guard against an indemnitor's injury.
Russ also argues that the Russ Release should not be
enforced because Russ suffered personal injury (i.e. death)
rather then property injury.

Brief of Appellant at 13. Russ

cites Fireman's Fund v. Burns Electronic Security Services, Inc.
for the proposition that the so-called minority rule is more
compelling in personal injury cases.
(111. 1980).

See 417 N.E.2d 131, 134

Fireman's Fund, however, is utterly inapplicable to

the case at bar.

Fireman's Fund addressed whether a party could
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recover in tort for economic damages.

Id. at 133-34.

Fireman's

Fund does not hold that exculpatory contracts are even disfavored
in personal injury claims.

Instead, it is clear that most cases

enforcing releases in fact involve personal injury claims. See,
e.g., Freund, 793 P.2d at 370.

For these reasons, Russ' public

policy arguments fail as a matter of law.
V.

RUSS RELEASE OPERATES AGAINST SURVIVOR.
In a final attempt to salvage his cause of action, Russ

argues that the Russ Release operates only against the decedent,
who signed the release, but not against her survivors.15 The
majority view is that release or settlement by a victim bars any
subsequent wrongful death action by the victim's survivors.
McClellan v. Boehmer. 700 S.W.2d. 687, 690 (Tex. App. 1985)
(stating that release bound descendant's beneficiaries). It
follows, then, that the Russ Release operates against Russ.
G.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Woodside respectfully

urges this Court to affirm the trial court's decision granting
summary judgment in Woodside's favor and against Russ.

15

Russ also asks the Court to reverse the trial court
because Russ has had insufficient time to conduct discovery.
Notwithstanding the fact that more than one year has passed since
Russ filed his Complaint, Russ failed to file the appropriate
Rule 56(f) memorandum necessary to postpone summary judgment.
Utah. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (1994); Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman.
740 P.2d 275, 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (awarding summary judgment
for lack of sufficient Rule 56(f) memorandum). Consequently,
Russ' discovery argument is no bar to summary judgment.
19

DATED this

zi

day of March, 1995.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

ivfl'S. Felt /
Pax
Robert 0. Rice
Attorneys for Appellees
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Exhibit A

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES J. RUSS, SR.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 940400115
DATE: September 19, 1994

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
WOODSIDE HOMES, INC., a Utah
corporation, and DOES I through XXX,
inclusive,
Defendants.

LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court for consideration of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Having received and considered Defendant's Motion, together with
memoranda in support, in opposition and in reply to the motion, the Court hereby grants the
motion as there are no genuine or material facts at issue and judgment is made as a matter of
law.
Specifically, the Court finds as follows:
On September 12, 1992, Defendant Woodside contracted with Charles J. and Rose P.
Russ (Plaintiff and Decedent) to build a home, and as part of that contract, signed an
agreement which contained various provisions, including a release for any injuries which
might occur on the job site. The provision stated that:
[t]he construction site is a dangerous place to visit. Buyer agrees to exercise extreme
caution if the Buyer chooses to visit the site, to limit the number of such visits, and to
refrain from allowing Buyer or other children to accompany Buyer on such visits.
Buyer, to the fullest extent permitted by law, agrees to hold harmless Woodside
(including its affiliates and subsidiaries and other contractors and subcontractors and
their agents and employees) from any and all claims, damages, loss and expenses,
including but not limited to attorney's fees arising out of any death, accident, injury,
or other occurrence resulting from visits to the job site by Buyer or Buyer's family or
other guests. (Emphasis added.)

While visiting the construction site of the home, Decedent fell into a hole in the
driveway of the home and was injured. Decedent died on December 12, 1992, presumably
as a result of those injuries. Plaintiff brought suit on March 1, 1994.
Plaintiff argues that the terms of the release in the contract covering the RussWoodside Homes transaction were not clearly and unequivocally stated and therefore the
release is not effective. Plaintiff argues that since the causative factor, i.e., Defendant's
negligence, is not stated in the release, that the possibility of negligent acts was not intended
by the parties to be controlled by the release.
While the release may not specifically address causative factors, or specifically
mention the effect of any negligence on the part of the Defendant, the fact that the language
in the release holds Defendant harmless "to the fullest extent permitted by law" would seem
to include negligent acts. The law in most circumstances will not allow a release of
intentional torts or gross negligence, but where the contract language provides a release to
the "fullest extent permitted by law," would seem as a matter of course to include negligent
acts.
The language in the release is very specific as to the type of injury the parties
foresaw. The Agreement warned Plaintiff and his wife that a construction site was a
dangerous place to visit and suggested that visits be limited and to use extreme caution when
making visits. Additionally, the release specifically held Defendant harmless from "death,
accident, injury or other occurrence;" in fact, Plaintiff in his Complaint uses this same
specific language when he states "at the time of the accident described herein."
This Court is persuaded that Plaintiff and Decedent were put on notice as to the type
of possible injury which could be sustained in a visit to the job site and that it was their
intent to release Defendant or its subcontractors from any possible negligent acts.
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no

effect until such order is signed by the Court.
Dated this 19th day of September, 1994.
BYT

cc:

Paul S. Felt, Esq.
Charles F. Abbott, Esq.
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Exhibit B

ADDENDUM T
AGREEMENT TO COMMENCE CONSTRUCTION
itaa of fcemott Monejufncl nemovsjof Contingencies
Relet

h

Buyer, whathfer one or more)
l/we(
aftar referradto aa Byytr,
9 (hereinafter
horoby ri/leate toyjoodsld* \ lornas Co poration (herelnaf tar rtlt rrad to aa Woodslde) the turn of I
/ / * P / / nLf **—'
f l|
(consisting of i ^ T r O f t ^
Earneat Monay Deposit previously reoelved by Woodslde *nd ^n additional dep08l\of *IQ$LJ3LJJ,
^
5? consideration fpr Woodaldo beginning construction on^he^hgm* to ba built on Lot
^ '
of J^fi-ruJ^ tt&Gi*ffim&
County of ^WhU^. City of UfmMlrjh*J^t 3t$tfc"of Utah. These fund* ara to Inaura WoodtJda that Buyer will comprete tht
purchase of the home. Buyt»r hereby removes all contingencies and conditions precedent which may have boon specifically listed In
paragraph 15 of tha Earnest Money Sal** Agroement for Rosldentlsl Construction and paragraph C of Addendum -A'* to the Earnest Money
Sales Agreement lor Residential Construction, respectively.
in the srent Buyer does not consummate the purchase of tha home within tiro business days following completion of eonitruetlon, as
evidenced by a Final Inspection and Certlflcrito of OccupAnoy Issued by the City/County of ^ / J r ^ A ^
I / / ^ . /lot/
shall be
retained by Woodelde as liquidated damages. The foregoing sentence shall not raotiict nor limit any of the rights Woodalde may huva as a
result of Buyer's default hereunder, including the right to seek and obtain specific performance.
Woodslde hereby agrees to begin construction of the home and agrees that the funds aforementioned shall be credited to Buyer as part of
downpaymenl or closing costs, If and only t^Buyer takaa title to the home within the fhre business days following flnaJ Inspection as outlined
abort.

Completion Dab
The final completion date as contained In paragraph a (o) of the
4, Une one of Addendum "A" thereto is heraby amended
This final completion date may be automatically extended
tors beyond Woodalde's control for a period equal to the duration ol such Interruption.
Job Bile Vrtltt
Tht construction site U a dangerous pl«cg to vlell. Buyer agr«»» to exerolee extreme caution ir Buyer chooses to visit the site, to limit the
number of auch visits, and to refrain from allowing Buysr'i or other children to accompany Buyer on such visits. Buyer, to tha fullest extent
permitted by letr, agrees to hold harmless Wood*!de (including Its nfllllatot and subsidiaries and other contrsctora and subcontractor and
their agents and employees) from any and alt claims, damages, to** and expenses, Including but not limited to attorney's leas, arising out of
any death, accident, injury, or other occurrence resulting from visits to tha Job site by Buyef Of Buyer's family of other guests.

i-

LocMn
Buyer agroos that any lock.in nf an Intereot rate with lander Is done entirely at his own risk and dlsoretlon, Buy*r agrees to hold harmless
Woodslde and any of Its agonts or representatives If final completion extends boyond any lock-In period that Buyer may negotiate with the
Under. Any estimate of a possible completion date solicited by Buyer for the purpose of ascertaining a lock-m period, arranging for the
move, airing a landlord notice, or for any other purposo shall be and Is understood by Buyer to be only an estimate and Shall not serve to
modify the delivery provisions contained in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement lor Residential Construction or any addendum thereto. Including this addendum.

Inttrett Rett*
Interest rates fluotuate on a dally basis. Buyer therefore acknowledges that the rata at closing may be higher,-tower, or tha same as that
which la available at the time this document i» executed. Buyer acknowledges that any Information aoflcrttd from Woodslde or their
aforementioned afUlltttos or agents concerning future Interest rate levels, points, vr whether It la prudent to look-in a rate la porory opinion
and Buyer hereby agrees to hold these parties harmless from any loss or action which may ooour from basing financial decisions on a'ald opl»
nlons.
This agreement shall not restrict nor limit any of the rights either party may have by virtue of tha Earnest Money 8alee Agreement for Residential Construction or any addendurns thereto which have beon executed previously.
Limitation on Warranties
The

lelont of paragraph 7 of Addendum "A H ^TW hereby Incorporated by referenoe Into this docurneiu.

Oils

Sales Consultant

Buyer
FINAL ACCEPTANCE Tho foregoing Addondum "B

lonthl*

7*1*j

WOCDSIDS HOMOC CORPOftATlOl
A, (^^acknowledge

TtTLI
Ipt of a flnaf copy of the forooolng Agreement bearing all signatures:
OMES JTORPQRATION

SIGNATURE OF BUYER

